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os protestos com aqueles ocorridos em economias emergentes semelhantes, 
como o Brasil. Ou seja, em vez das manifestações que ocorreram em países que 
experimentam uma curva de declínio económico; quarto,exploramos o papel 
dos jovens nos protestos; e, finalmente, olhamos para onde o movimento está 
agora.
Palavras-chave: Turquia; protestos populares; urbanização; democratização.
Resumen: El trabajo está organizado en cinco partes: En primer lugar, ofrecemos 
un breve resumen de las protestas y el concepto de “derecho a la ciudad”; En 
segundo lugar, se discuten los argumentos sobre el papel de la democracia 
y la representación y el estilo de liderazgo autoritario del Primer Ministro de 
Turquía, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a la causa de las protestas; tercero, presentamos 
nuestro caso al comparar las protestas a los ocurridos en economías emergentes 
similares, como Brasil, es decir, en lugar de los hechos ocurridos en los países que 
experimentan una curva de declinación económica; cuarto, se explora el papel de 
los jóvenes en las protestas; y, por último, nos fijamos en donde el movimiento 
es ahora.
Palabras clave: Turquía; protestas; la urbanización; la democratización.
Many mainstream accounts of the Taksim-Gezi park protests that 
took place in Turkey in 2013, have made reference to the so-called Arab 
Spring events in Middle Eastern and North African countries. The same 
question was asked across a number of these accounts: Are the Taksim 
Protests Turkey’s ‘Arab Spring’? (SADIKI, 2013; SEYMOUR 2013; 
CELIK, 2013; MOUKALLED, 2013). Other accounts place the Taksim-
Gezi park protests in the category of the Occupy/anti-austerity protests 
that have taken place in the US and Europe – particularly since 2010 – 
against large scale public spending cuts and rising unemployment rates, 
especially for the young population in these countries. In this article, 
we explore some of the claims that underpin the categorisations of the 
Taksim protests as either a ‘Turkish Spring’ or part of a global Occupy 
movement. Drawing on British geographer David Harvey’s concept 
of the ‘right to the city’ we argue that the protests were sparked by 
processes of neoliberal urbanization and therefore cannot be categorised 
as Turkey’s ‘Spring’. But distinctions also need to be made between the 
Taksim-Gezi protests and the demonstrations that have taken place in 
countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, since Turkey’s economic 
and political situation differs markedly from these crisis-ridden contexts. 
The article is organised in five parts: first, we offer a brief overview 
of the protests and the concept of the ‘right to the city’; second, we 
discuss arguments about the role of democracy and representation, 
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and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s authoritarian leadership 
style in relation to the cause of the protests; third, we put forward our 
case for comparing the protests with those which occurred in similarly 
rising economies, namely Brazil, rather than the demonstrations that 
occurred in countries experiencing a downward economic turn; fourth, 
we explore the role of young people in the protests; and finally, we look 
at where the movement is now.
Taksim-Gezi 2013
The protests began on 27 May 2013 as a small campaign against 
redevelopment. The initial aim of those who gathered in Taksim square 
was to stop developers from building an Ottoman-style shopping-
centre that was to be housed in a replica of a military barracks building 
demolished sixty years ago. The main objection of the protestors 
was that the building of the shopping centre would result in the 
destruction of much of Gezi Park, one of the last green spots in central 
Istanbul (Europe’s biggest city and the business capital of Turkey). 
There are numerous shopping malls in Istanbul, at least one in every 
neighbourhood, but only very few public green spaces left. However, 
the character of the protests changed when the Turkish police attacked 
demonstrators with considerable force and what started out as an 
environmental protest in Istanbul quickly turned into a nation-wide 
political demonstration against the policies of Prime Minister Tayyip 
Erdogan and his government. The protest rapidly gained support from 
a cross-section of society in Istanbul and other urban centres leading 
to what was arguably the largest wave of protests in recent Turkish 
history. An estimated 3.5 million people took part in the protests over 
the course of following few months. The protests were generally led and 
dominated by young middle class professionals and university students, 
and while they expressed a wide range of demands including wider 
access to resources and freedom of expression, a new kind of urban 
living remained at the centre of the events. Our contention, drawing on 
Harvey, is that issues related to the city and its quality of life dominated 
the protests. 
David Harvey attempts, in his book, Rebel Cities, to integrate his 
theory of urbanization into the ‘general laws of motion’ of capital, 
to provide a framework for analysing the current crisis of capitalism 
and the development of neoliberal trends in the world. In Harvey’s 
analysis, urbanization is both the product of and the driving force for the 
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absorption of ‘surplus product’ in the process of capital accumulation. 
For Harvey, “to claim the right to the city ... is to claim some kind of 
shaping power over the process of urbanization, over the ways in which 
our cities are made and re-made and so in a fundamental and radical 
way” (HARVEY, 2012, p. 5).1 Harvey seeks to root the term in the 
concrete reality of class struggle, claiming that the right to the city does 
not “arise primarily out of various intellectual fascinations and fads ... 
It primarily rises up from the streets, out from the neighbourhoods, as 
a cry for help and sustenance by oppressed peoples in desperate times” 
(HARVEY, 2012, p. xiii). For Harvey, “Urbanization ... has played a 
crucial role in the absorption of capital surpluses, at ever increasing 
geographical scales, but at the price of burgeoning processes of creative 
destruction that have dispossessed the masses of any right to the city 
whatsoever” (HARVEY, 2012, p. 22).
It is no coincidence that the demonstrations started and were 
concentrated in Istanbul, the largest and the most developed urban 
centre in Turkey. Istanbul is a unique example of contemporary urban 
development with the wide-scale urban transformation and regeneration 
projects in place. It was in the 1980s, soon after the military coup 
in Turkey, that the city witnessed the beginning of the neoliberal 
transformation and the celebration of property rights, in line with 
transformations that occurred in other metropolitan centres such as 
New York, London and Madrid.
Metropolitan cities now have central significance in the system of 
global capitalist surplus production. Harvey writes, 
it is the metropolis that now constitutes a vast common produced 
by the collective labour expended on and in the city. The right to 
use that common must surely then be accorded to all those who 
have had a part in producing it. This is, of course, the basis for the 
claim to the right to the city on the part of the collective labourers 
who have made it. The struggle for the right to the city is against the 
powers of capital that ruthlessly feed upon and extract rents from 
the common life that others have produced.2
1 The phrase, ‘right to the city’, was coined by the Marxist urban theorist Henry Lefebvre in 1968 
in response to the upsurge of urban struggle that exploded in France during May of that year.
2 “The right to the city is not an exclusive individual right, but a focused collective right. It is 
inclusive not only of construction workers but also of all those who facilitate the reproduction 
of daily life: the caregivers and teachers, the sewer and subway repair men, the plummers 
and electricians, the scaffold erectors and crane operators, the hospital workers and the truck, 
bus, and taxi drivers, the restaurant workers and the entertainers, the bank clerks and the city 
administrators.” (HARVEY, 2012, p. 78 & 137) 
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In this sense, the Taksim-Gezi protests share common ground 
with a great many diverse social movements focusing on the urban 
question, from India and Brazil to China, Spain, Argentina and the 
US.3 Just a few months before the Taksim-Gezi protests started, David 
Harvey spoke about the urban origins of the social movements and 
referred to Istanbul’s rapid urbanization, asking “What do we see in 
Istanbul? Cranes, everywhere.” (URBAN CLASS WARFARE…, 
2013). According to Harvey, urbanization is a channel through which 
surplus capital flows to build/ re-build cities for those who can afford it. 
In his contribution to the analysis of contemporary capitalist production 
process, such urban re-generation is a powerful and essential process 
that in return defines what contemporary cities are about, as well as 
determining who can afford to live in these redesigned urban spaces and 
who cannot. The cities also happen to be the quintessential places where 
the contestation of neoliberal urbanization may take place in various 
forms and intensities. On the basis of this analysis, Harvey highlights 
the importance of challenging the state and addresses the ever-changing 
ideal of the city and the social groups that sustain and contest it. 
Democracy and ‘representation’
Some of those hasty proclamations of a ‘Turkish Spring’ that we 
mentioned in our introduction to this chapter, concentrate on Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s increasingly anti-democratic 
and authoritarian ruling style. They compare Erdogan’s rule with that 
of former president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak. The slogan: “Taksim 
will become Tahrir” encapsulated the claim that the Taksim protests 
represent the next stage of the ‘Arab Spring’.4
Since Erdogan prides himself on being a democratically elected 
leader with strong grassroots support, his critics now pose questions such 
as how to define majority in representative democracies and whether a 
regime can still be considered a representative democracy when it does 
3 This is in line with David Harvey’s reworking of Marxist political theory which places the city 
first and foremost, in terms of its position as a generator of capital accumulation, as opposed to 
the factory/ work place. Harvey explains that “the concept of work has to shift from a narrow 
definition attaching to industrial forms of labor to the far broader terrain of the work entailed 
in the production and reproduction of an increasingly urbanized daily life” (HARVEY, 2012, 
p. 138). Harvey also discusses how urbanization will play a key role in social conflicts of today. 
4 ‘Comrades from Cairo’ (Mosireen) a non-profit media collective in Cairo born out of the 
explosion of citizen media and cultural activism in Egypt during the uprising against Mubarak 
‘From Taksim and Rio to Tahrir, the smell of teargas. Open letter by the Egyptian activist 
collective from Cairo’, 29 June 2013, in ROAR Magazine.
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not follow policies to serve the interests of the majority. It is reasonable 
to suggest that the 12 year long to date, AKP rule, has not led to the 
creation of a fair distribution of income; the benefits of huge economic 
success were not shared equitably by all strata of the population, and 
as far as the Human Development Index is concerned Turkey is still a 
very unequal country (MALIK, 2013). Most of the policies of the AKP 
favour the new bourgeoisie, the extended middle and upper middle 
classes rather than the vast majority of the working people. We agree 
with these observations. However, these observations are not directly 
relevant in terms of whether the AKP (Justice and Development Party) 
regime represents the interests of majority in Turkey’s representative 
democracy. 
‘Democracy’ means government (power) by the people. The term 
democracy is normally employed to designate the parliamentary regimes 
which developed in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century on 
the ‘British model’ (BESLEY; COATE, 1998, p. 139-156. GERMAİN, 
1948). Representative democracy refers to a system of government in 
which representatives are elected by popular vote. These representatives 
then poll their constituents on the various matters and represent them 
in the large meeting called the parliament. Representative democracy 
is the basis of constitutional democracy existing in many Western 
countries. All those countries which call themselves democratic have 
a representative system of democracy. The insitutionalisation of this 
system of democracy is often justified on the basis that it is the only form 
of democracy which is viable in the larger and more complex societies 
of today. Even though representatives are chosen by the people to act in 
their best interest, this does not mean that they necessarily act the way 
the people want them to in every circumstance. Theoretically, power 
rests with the elected representatives, but this is evidently not the case 
since the policies implemented by governments may often be contrary 
to the interests of the working people, and almost always in line with 
the interests of the powerful big business. This is a form of democracy 
but quite different from straight-up majority rule. This is what Alexis 
de Tocqueville called the ‘dictatorship of the majority’ (HORWİTZ, 
1996, p. 293-307).5
An alternative system, participatory democracy, where members 
of the public are effectively members of the government by voting 
5 Tocqueville is either referring to John Adams coinage of the term in his “Reflections” or, perhaps 
more likely, to Edmund Burke’s appropriation of Adams in his critique of the French Revolution 
“Reflections of the revolution in France”
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directly on all policies, is widely recognised as the only ‘real’ form of 
democracy. However, this is often considered unpractical and difficult to 
administer and as a result, most modern democracies are representative. 
For the most part, the regimes exercise their hegemonic power moving 
between consent and coercion, which was once described by Antonio 
Gramsci as “half man, half beast” – Gramsci took this term over from 
Machiavelli as the image of power as a centaur, a necessary combination 
of consent and coercion (GİLL, 1993, p. 52).
Turkey’s Tayyip Erdogan has been, by far, the most popular 
politician in Turkey after winning three consecutive elections and with 
an increasing majority: 34 per cent in 2002, 47 per cent in 2007 and 
more than 50 per cent in 2011. His success and popularity is interlinked 
with Turkey’s economic development: Erdogan’s leadership coincided 
with an impressive growth spurt for Turkey which placed the country 
among the top ten emerging stars of the world alongside with the BRICS 
– Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Turkey’s per capita 
income was tripled within a decade under Erdogan’s leadership. The 
annual economic output of the Turkish economy is, at $10,000 per 
person, about the same level as Brazil or Mexico and has been growing 
at a steady pace.6 
Alongside managing a growing economy, Erdogan’s government 
achieved significant political successes during this period. The AKP 
regime has been dealing effectively with the coup leaders of Turkey’s 
recent troubled past. A large number of generals were arrested, and 
one in three imprisoned. It was also under Erdogan’s leadership that 
significant steps were taken to calm the decades-long violent conflict 
with the country’s significant Kurdish minority (AMENDİNG 
TURKİSH CONSTİTUTİON FOR KURDİSH QUESTİON, s.d.). 
However, these successes have fuelled Erdogan’s sense of his own 
importance in Turkey’s recent economic rise and a sense that he is 
invincible. His excessive use of the state apparatus to establish his 
power base to such excess has led to accusations that he is indeed 
governing the country in the same autocratic style for which he had 
bitterly criticised the secular generals. After 12 years and three terms 
in power the result is the emergence of an increasingly authoritarian, 
religiously inspired and obsessively neoliberal system. It is based on 
a cleverly crafted hegemonic apparatus. This has been quite evident 
6 What has impressed many analysts over the past 10 years is the broad nature of Turkey’s 
economic development. The industrial and services sectors has expanded alongside tourism.
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since 2011, with violent repression of public protests, the jailing of 
journalists on suspicion of conspiring with terrorists, the pressure being 
put upon newspaper owners to sack critical journalists; and the updating 
of the 1980s’ military regime’s anti-terrorism laws (GOKAY, 2012).
All the above mentioned developments are symptomatic of an 
administration that has spent too long in power and become too confident 
about its capacity to maintain electoral power. Therefore, perhaps the 
recent conflict in Turkey between the Government and its people – which 
found its most powerful expression in the Taksim Gezi Park protest – 
boils down more than anything else to a style of ruling and in particular 
to the style of a leader who is increasingly intolerant of dissent. As his 
regime provides material improvement in the lives of large sections 
of Turkey’s population, so his leadership becomes more confidently 
autocratic. This confidence is based on electoral success with almost 53 
per cent of Turks voting for him in the 2011 election. While Erdogan and 
the AKP may be showing signs of becoming increasingly undemocratic, 
this does not justify the categorisation of the events in Turkey as part 
of an ‘Arab Spring’. Despite the obvious ‘Tahrir feel’ of Taksim, we 
argue that there are a number of substantial differences between the 
Taksim protests in 2013 and the Arab Spring events. To begin with, 
Egypt’s Mubarak was a dictator, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is an elected 
prime minister. More importantly, the Arab uprisings were mass events 
preceded by massive economic crises, while the protest movement 
in Turkey is a mainly middle-class movement, with mostly young 
educated people defending lifestyle matters. The Turkish protestors 
were, in general, educated professionals and university students many 
from reasonably well-off families and good job prospects. And they 
were well connected through technology. This suggests the new middle 
class of an emerging powerhouse. They protested about their quality of 
life, about future opportunities, and freedom of expression (TURKİSH 
PROTESTERS ARE YOUNG..., 2013). 
The mainstream terminology used by the Western media and 
experts, and shared by some Left/ Liberal accounts, both in Turkey and 
abroad, made comparisons between Taksim and Tahrir Square referring 
to the ability of the street to topple a government. Some even claimed 
that “the Gezi Park resistance is a [revolutionary] turning point for the 
people of Turkey. After many decades they feel their power again” 
(ALMAN, 2013). However tempting, we believe such comparisons 
represent a gross over-simplification based on a range of superficial 
similarities many of which ignore the class analysis of the events. The 
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political-economic roots of the events in Turkey are also very different 
from those of its war-torn Arab neighbours, that is, the majority of 
Turkish protesters hold professional jobs or are university students with 
reasonably good job prospects as opposed rather than being unemployed 
and economically desperate as many of the young people who took the 
Arab streets were. 
Turkey’s protests also need to be distinguished from the discontent 
expressed in some of its European neighbours, such as Greece and 
Spain where weak economies brought unemployed youth out onto the 
streets. The riot police in Turkey employed considerable force against 
the Taksim-Gezi protestors, not unlike Spanish, Italian, Greek, and 
British police tactics that were witnessed during the same months when 
hundreds of thousands of protestors walked against their crisis-ridden 
governments’ austerity policies. In those European countries comparable 
levels of police force were employed, with the same instruments – tear 
gas, water cannons and plastic bullets – to pacify the protesters and 
control the angry crowd. However, interestingly, none of these European 
events were considered as a British, Greek or Spanish ‘Spring’! 
Undoubtedly, the two events, Turkey’s and Egypt’s, started and 
centred in two symbolic squares- Tahrir and Taksim; just like Tahrir 
Square Taksim has become a strong reminder of the power of public 
space; a number of normally rigorously competing football fans unified 
in their opposition to their governments’ policies leaving aside their 
historical differences to defend ‘their city’; protesters demanded the 
resignation of the rulers in both cases; and the police responded harshly 
both in Tahrir and Taksim squares (IN ISTANBUL’S HEART..., 2013).7 
But the similarities end here. Still, some articles in the mainstream 
media focused mainly on the Turkish government’s Islamism and 
the presence of secular groups within the demonstrations, presenting 
Turkey’s protests as yet another example of an Oriental Muslim dictator 
oppressing his mostly secular subjects. These interpretations tend to 
simplify complex and multi-layered events into gratifying morality 
tales about Western democratic secularists versus conservative Islamist 
(SCALEA, 2013). They are also ethnocentric, presenting Muslims only 
in clichés and run the risk of creating a cultural caricature.8
7 A poll published in the Hurriyet Daily News, 2013, revealed that 70 percent of the protesters 
insisted they did not ‘feel close’ to any political party.
8 Such Eurocentric prejudices had emerged over centuries, supported by the writings of leading 
Western thinkers/ writers. Immanuel Kant, for instance, divided humans into four racial categories, 
set apart from each other by differences in natural disposition. “Humanity”, he writes, is “at its 
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Brazil, Turkey (and Chile) – Protests Follow 
Economic Success
It would be more appropriate to make comparisons between the 
demonstrations in Turkey and the protests in Brazil, which started just 
a couple of weeks after the protests in Taksim. The Brazilian urban 
unrest began in early June 2013 against a proposed 7 per cent rise in 
public transfort fares but spiralled into a host of other concerns about 
public services more generally. The protestors were also demonstrating 
against the stadium-building for the 2014 World Cup on grounds of 
displacement and waste of public resources. 
One might even include the student protests in Chile in 2011 here.9 
Despite their significant differences, in particular in terms of the reactions 
from the Turkish and Brazilian authorities, both Turkish and Brazilian 
protesters seemed to be coming from similar class backgrounds and 
ages, and they were making similar demands of democracy in similarly 
innovative ways. One placard in Sao Paulo read “Peace is over, Turkey is 
here” (RT, 15 June 2013; Business Insider, 14 June 2013). The political 
economic conditions in both countries present a similar picture: As 
Castells notes, both Brazil and Turkey are among the group of Emerging 
Powers with no economic crisis. In both, but Brazil particulary, there 
were strong anti-poverty programes by the state led by popular parties. 
In Brazil, a popular Left party is in political power, and in Turkey a 
populist centre-right party, inspired by liberal islamic values, is in the 
driving seat (CASTELLS, 2014).
There are a number of other comparisons that one would make 
of Turkey and Brazil, (and Chile too): both are dynamic regional 
powers with booming economies and popular, democratically elected 
governments; both countries are exerting increasingly considerable and 
independent influence in the regional and global affairs, and often being 
 greatest perfection in the race of the whites”. (EZE, 1997, p.47, 55 and 63) Similarly, James 
Mill, great British philosopher and historian of the 19th century, wrote a five-volume history of 
India to demonstrate how deficient the Indians are in governance, science, philosophy, art, and 
technology. Today other Western writers repeat a similar line. Niall Ferguson, for instance, asserts 
that without the spread of British rule, colonised people, such as Chinese and Indians, would not 
have parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, incorrupt government, and individual freedoms. 
(FERGUSON, 2003).
9 Massive protests of August 2011 or the Chilean Education Conflict (as labelled in Chilean 
media), a series of ongoing student-led protests across Chile, demanding a new framework for 
education in the country. Beyond the specific demands regarding education, there is a feeling 
that the protests reflect a ‘deep discontent’ among some parts of society with Chile’s high level 
of inequality. Recently, following the start of the protest movement in Brazil, mostly peaceful 
demonstrations started again across the country to demand education reform.
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cited as models of economic growth; both have been developing global 
ambitions. Brazil is the B of the BRICS and the largest economy in 
the Western hemisphere after the US. Turkey is at a critical junction 
of Europe and the Middle East, and is a key geopolitical player in the 
Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East. 
There are, of course, some divergences too. The immediate, explicit 
issues which led to the protests are not exactly the same, but similarly 
urban: the government’s plan to redevelop Gezi Park, an urban park next 
to Istanbul’s Taksim Square in Turkish case, it was very much ‘a right 
to the city’ type of a movement; an increase in public transport fares 
in Sao Paulo in Brazilian case for free bus fares and under the slogan 
“Copa pra quem?” (Whose Cup?) tens of thousands of young Brazilians 
took to the streets, occupied and set-up neighborhood assemblies to 
reclaim their city from neoliberal forces. The governments are not at 
all alike, Turkey having a long-serving popular leader who heads a 
conservative Islamist party; and Brazil with a relatively new president, 
Dilma Rousseff, a former leftist guerrilla who was imprisoned and 
tortured in the 1970s during military dictatorship, heading a leftist 
popular movement. But there is a very important similarity: they are 
both representative democracies. Not only that, each country has a 
powerful military that had been involved in politics in the not too 
distant past. But now, both countries have managed to put their armies 
in the barracks, and therefore their democracies are considered quite 
stable. Based on their economic progress in the recent past, investment 
in health, education and other public services, reasonably widespread 
development of their citizens living standards, and reasonably stable 
democratic process, both countries are often cited as examples of 
previously underdeveloped countries able to overcome their troubled 
political past. In this sense, there is no Turkey Spring as there is no 
Brazilian Spring.10 This is not Tunisia, Egypt or Libya. Democratically 
elected governments in Turkey and in Brazil are far more resilient 
and their leaders far more popular and secure in their power than the 
North African dictators swept away by the events of 2011. Despite 
his increasingly authoritarian policies, Turkey’s Erdogan still remains 
immensely popular among the country’s poor and deeply religious 
majority. 
10 It is interesting to note that just before the bus hike fees, and important student demonstration was 
held in the southern city of Porto Alegre, around the Old Gas Station, against the desctruction 
of a local park for the construction of a Mall. This was coordinated by the same students groups 
that would organize for the later protests (though not the same people)
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However, as can be seen in many ‘democratic’ countries, 
democratically elected leaders often come to have an inflated sense 
of knowing better than their citizens what is best for their citizens, 
and they have a tendency to favour prestigious infrastructure projects 
over what affects most peoples’ daily lives. This is exactly what is 
at stake both in Turkey and Brazil. So, in one sense, both in Brazil 
and Turkey, participatory democracy was forcefully diluted among an 
orgy of neoliberal mega-projects, generating dubious profits for a small 
elite in their respective countries. In the Turkish case, it is the ruling 
AKP’s collusion with powerful business interests in the so–called re-
development of Istanbul. In the Brazilian case, it revolves around the 
use of massive public funds for the ‘for-profit’ hosting of the World Cup 
and the Olympics.11 This is common feature of contemporary capitalist 
system in the context of so-called urban re-development and cultural 
investment in and around many modern metropolitan centres. This is 
justified by an economic argument around the importance to capitalism 
of land, rent and speculation more so than straightforward production. 
As Harvey notes, “[o]ver the past 30-40 years, where cities try to brand 
themselves and sell a piece of their history. What is the image of a city? 
Is it attractive to tourists? Is it trendy? So a city will market itself” 
(INTERVİEW WİTH DAVİD HARVEY: REBEL CİTİES & URBAN 
RESİSTANCE PART II, 2013). There are many passages describing this 
situation in David Harvey’s Rebel Cities, such as:
Much of the corruption that attaches to urban politics relates to how 
public investments are allocated to produce something that looks 
like a common but which promotes gains in private asset values for 
privileged property owners. The distinction between urban public 
goods and urban commons is both fluid and dangerously porous. 
How often are development projects subsidized by the state in the 
name of the common interest when the true beneficiaries are a few 
landholders, financiers, and developers? (HARVEY, 2012, p. 78). 
The events in Turkey and Brazil in 2013 illustrate to how the 
authorities responded to the crowd when their ‘grand’ projects of 
neoliberal restructuring were challenged by their citizens, many 
11 There is a background to this: since 2008, the ongoing pacification programmes in Rio’s favelas 
which entail a neoliberal urbanized approach to social and class warfare through the application 
o0f a range of different public policies to “troubled” neighbourhoods, such as special police 
units (Pacification Police Units, UPP) patrolling favelas to help broker peace being warring drug 
traffickers.
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of whom may have voted for the ruling parties. No representative 
democracy is fully democratic, but neither are the Turkish, Brazilian 
and Chilean rulers’ unique in not fully representing the demands of 
their populations. In the UK, which is often considered one of the best 
examples of Western parliamentary democracy, just over ten years ago 
in February - March 2003, Tony Blair’s Labour government utterly 
ignored huge demonstrations against the prospect of war in Iraq. These 
were the largest demonstrations ever in the history of his country, 
including the two-million strong anti-war protest that took place in 
London in February 2003. However, Blair and his government pressed 
on with a disastrous war policy against Iraq. The surveys of that time 
(March 2003) pointed out that fifty-five per cent of Britons agreed that 
the London marchers were right because the war was delivered on false 
pretences and delivered little other than bloodshed. There were also 
global protests against the war in Iraq: three million people protested on 
the streets of Rome, in what was considered to be the largest anti-war 
rally ever in human history, and anywhere between 10 and 30 million 
people in other metropoles around the world participated in similar 
protests. Still, none of this made any serious impact on the decisions 
of the Blair government regarding starting a war in Iraq. The Western 
governments’ refusal to listen to the anti-war protesters was such a 
dramatic illustration of the limits of parliamentary democracy, but also 
such events shaped a strong and growing taste for direct action, one can 
find many examples from the anti-Vietnam War actions in the 1970s to 
the occupy movements of the 2008-13.12
Until recently, Turkey, Chile and Brazil were the envy of much of 
the world. With their spectacular economic rise since the late 1990s 
these were among the fastest developing countries on earth. All three 
countries have seen a strong period of mass growth, economically and 
population-wise. While the structural inequalities and long standing 
corruption culture did not disappear, sustained growth brought in 
enough tax revenues to improve both education and health spending in 
Brazil and Turkey. The boom also allowed the governments to create 
jobs for the massively young population and increase minimum wages 
12 Guardian/ICM poll, in February 2003, shows that at least one person from 1.25 million 
households in Britain went on Saturday’s anti-war march in London, confirming estimates that 
between one million and two million people went on the march. The poll shows it is the prime 
minister’s personal standing rather than the Labour party which has suffered the wrath of anti-
war voters. Labour’s standing is down four points from 43% last month to 39% this month but 
the government still maintains a healthy eight-point lead over the Conservatives. See TRAVİS, 
A; BLACK, I. Blair’s popularity plummets. The Guardian, 18 February 2003. 
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significantly without any apparent damage to employment. As a result 
of governments’ extension of welfare, health and educational provision, 
a large section of people in Turkey, and Brazil, has gained access to 
better public services.13
If we try to make a connection between these economic success 
stories and the recent protest movements, the first observation would 
be about how a strong cycle of economic enrichment over the past ten 
years has changed the public’s expectations of its politicians. Since 
Turkish, Chilean and Brazilian regimes achieved sustained growth and 
employment, delivering on growth and employment is no longer enough 
to satisfy the majority of their populations. Citizens increasingly hold 
their leaders accountable to improve the quality of public services, 
and to expand the boundaries of participatory democracy, and listen 
to their concerns closely. One therefore can consider the protests in 
Chile, Turkey and Brazil as a symptom of radically shifting demands, 
driven mostly by these emerging power houses’ economic success in 
the last decade. These are democratic protest movements in societies 
experiencing rapid social change where the public’s demand for better 
services and more democracy at local as well as national levels grow at 
a faster pace than their governments’ ability to provide. 
Despite the multiplication of the slogans and emerging chaos about 
the aims of the protesters, it is important to note that the protest of both 
Turkey’s and Brazil’s urban youth are first and foremost a response to the 
ruling regimes’ grandiose neoliberal projects of urban transformation,14 
their gentrifying schemes, with the aim of creating high-tech malls, 
skyscrapers, and expensive giant high-tec stadiums. All this is part of 
“the violent neoliberal attack upon the public provision of social public 
goods over the last thirty years or more” (HARVEY, 2012, p. 85).
It is also important to take note of the educated urban youth that 
is at the forefront of the resistance to such neoliberal assault. To many 
analysts, young people’s role in the protest movements came as a 
surprise because young people had been identified as apolitical and 
individualistic for decades. With the recent protest movements in the 
summer of 2013, urban youth proved that they cared about how the 
current policies of their governments are affecting their life, their urban 
13 SUROWIECKI. James. ‘Middle Class Militants’. The New Yorker, 8 July 2013; BOTT, Uwe. 
‘Brazil and Turkey: The Global Middle Class Rises’, The Globalist. June 21, 2013 
14 Although it should be noted that, in the case of Brazil, many urban project developed during the 
spike of Brazilian economy had public money in it, and the Development Bank and Petrobras 
were central in injecting stimula into the private sector with Public-Private partnerships and 
public funding programs.
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space, their country and their fellow citizens, and that they are willing 
to protest resiliently. 
Youth and urban ‘warfare’ 
Within neoliberal narratives, youth are mostly defined as a 
consumer market, a drain on the economy, or stand for trouble. … 
Young people increasingly have become subject to an oppressive 
disciplinary machine that teaches them to define citizenship through 
the exchange practices of the market and to follow orders and toe 
the line in the face of oppressive forms of authority. They are caught 
in a society in which almost every aspect of their lives is shaped 
by the dual forces of the market and a growing police state. The 
message is clear: Buy/ sell/ or be punished. (GIROUX, 2013)
These words of pessimism belong to the US social critic Henry 
Giroux. Much like the protesters in Turkey, demonstrators in Brazil had 
jobs and were well educated. They were mainly drawn from the country’s 
growing middle classes, which government figures show has ballooned 
by some 40 million over the past decade amid a commodities-driven 
economic boom. Unlike countries such as Greece and Spain where 
weak economies have brought the unemployed out onto the streets, the 
real long-term origins of the discontent in Brazil and Turkey has been 
created by strong economic growth (FAIOLA; MOURA, 2013). As 
standards of living have risen in general, so have people’s expectations 
for better services and wider participation in decision-making. Brazilian 
and Turkish youth were not protesting because they wanted to overthrow 
a dictator or because they were angry about massive unemployment. 
They were upset, and rightly so, about the priorities of their governments 
for their cities and the manner in which these priorities were pursued – 
without sufficient consultation by their governments. They demanded 
the right to participate in the planning and distribution of their country’s 
resources. In both countries, people demanded the right to be heard and 
to be involved, linked to the feeling that they were not really able to get 
involved in the decision-making that would alter their conceived urban 
space, and their day-to-day lives. They wanted the right to determine 
their own futures. They were no longer prepared to be talked down to 
by the government (SUROWIECKI, 2013). The protests can in one 
general sense be read as the articulation by those involved of what a fair 
and just world might be (SHAKER, 2013). Turkish and Brazilian youth, 
rejecting the neoliberal notion that democracy and markets are the same, 
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not only addressed some of the current injustices while reclaiming their 
urban space, but they also began to produce new ideas with a new and 
very imaginative political language
In the final analysis, we believe that the protest movements that 
arose in the urban areas of Turkey and Brazil in 2013, represent these 
political and social struggles (struggle over the city, and its urbanization), 
at least the beginning of them. These were the direct responses of youth 
in search of “a different way of urban living from that which was being 
imposed upon them by capitalist developers and the state” (SHAKER, 
2013, p. 21). In our view, the demonstrations can be connected to a wider 
discussion, first introduced by Henri Lefebvre in 1968 (LEFEBVRE, 
1996, p. 69-85), and recently developed by David Harvey around ‘the 
right to the city’ which is a right to democratic control over the process 
of urbanization. The specific aims of the protesters in Istanbul and São 
Paulo, to keep a green space as a public park and to defend affordable 
transportation fees for an urban public, are in a general sense their 
attempt to reclaim their city, their urban space. Whatever the initial 
results, or lack of specific gains, of the recent protests, Turkish and 
Brazilian youth created in 2013, “a critical mass of political energy” for 
a “struggle to fashion an alternative to globalisation that does not trade 
on monopoly rents in particular or cave in to multinational capitalism in 
general”, and initiated “a platform for what an alternative urbanization 
project might look like” (MAHON, 2012). 
Where is the movement now?
At the time of writing, protestors are marking the first anniversary 
of the Taksim–Gezi protests, with relatively small but well-organized 
demonstrations. The unrest sparked by the Taksim protests created one 
of the biggest challenges to Erdogan’s time in office, 12 years with an 
increasing electoral support. A lot has happened in the twelve months 
since then, including the mining explosion which occurred in the city of 
Soma in May 2014 taking the lives of 301 workers. Erdogan’s apparent 
indifference to the plight of the miners and their families provoked 
some renewed outrage and a fresh set of disturbances in cities after he 
publically downplayed the accident. Arriving fresh on the back of a 
corruption scandal, the mining disaster offered a potential platform for 
widening the net of the predominantly young, urban and well-educated 
Gezi movement, but so far these attempts remained relatively low profile 
comparing with the events of 2013 summer.
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Erdogan not only remains in power but his party achieved an 
overwhelming victory in the local elections in March 2014 furthering 
Erdogan’s chances of running for president in August. And, in fact, his 
victory in the 2014 Presidential Elections (with 51.8 %, and more than 
21 million of voters) did not constitute a surprise (he has now an open 
field to create a presidentialist regime in the country). Erdogan may have 
alienated the secular middle class youth by introducing new curbs on the 
sale of alcohol and Internet use. There has been a clear determination 
of the use of force to police urban demonstrations but Erdogan still 
maintains a large following, especially among poorer and more religious 
voters of the Anatolian towns and the countryside. And the reason for 
this lies in the significant economic growth that has coincided with the 
AKP rule in the last 10 years, and the appeal to traditionalist religious 
values that AKP seems to have secured.
As long as the economy performs reasonably well, it seems the 
ruling party can manage to secure this strong support and quell the 
impetus of the Gezi movement. But economic success is not necessarily 
a guarantee for a stable and democratic progress as the Taksim Gezi 
protestors highlighted a year ago. Erdogan has successfully chipped 
away at the security services, the army and the judiciary, and established 
his overriding authority by crushing democratic protests. But this is all 
very dangerous for him and his party: all this centralisation of power 
also means the centralisation of blame – as recently witnessed following 
the Soma mine disaster. 
The Taksim-Gezi protests showed that the relationship between 
economic and social development of a country and the democratization 
of its political system is considerably complex. We, however, believe 
that it would be safe to claim that there is a fragile but essential link 
between being a strong economic power and establishing a stable 
democratic system in the long run: One does not survive long without 
the other. Neither will tend to last long in the conditions of the absence 
of the other. Today, Turkey is still a rising economic power, with its 
internationally competitive companies turning the youthful nation 
into an entrepreneurial hub, tapping cash-rich export markets in the 
Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East while attracting significant 
levels of investment in return. But all this progress will require a stable 
and functioning democracy to survive. It is not possible for Turkey to be 
a credible world power without achieving fully functioning democratic 
status, including freedom of expression and democratic rights. There is 
no exception to this, all existing evidence from the transition countries 
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point to this same conclusion. Turkey will become a real global power 
and a country at peace with the majority of its citizens only when its 
economic progress is matched by a strong, stable and functioning 
democratic system.
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